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ABSTRACT 
A simple model of offshoring, which depicts offshoring as ‘shadow migration,’ permits 
parsimonious derivation of necessary and sufficient conditions for the effects on wages, 
prices, production and trade. We show that offshoring requires modification of the four 
classic international trade theorems. We also show that offshoring is an independent source 
of comparative advantage and can lead to intra-industry trade in a Walrasian setting. The 
model is extended to allow for two-way offshoring between similar nations and to allow 
for monopolistic competition. We also show that, unlike trade in goods, trade in tasks 
typically makes all types of workers better off in both the host and home countries (with 
some proviso). 
1.  Introduction 
The fragmentation and offshoring of production processes has been an important phenomenon for 
many years (Hummels, Ishii, and Yi 2001; Berger 2006), having started in earnest in the mid-1980s in 
East Asia and across the US-Mexico border. Ando and Kimura (2005) and Urata (2001), for example, 
document the linked rise of foreign direct investment, offshoring, and parts and components trade by 
Japanese firms in East Asia. In North America, the 1980s saw the widespread emergence of ‘twin 
plants’  (one on  either side of the US-Mexico  border) under the Maquiladora  programme (Federal 
Reserve  2002,  Feenstra  and  Hanson  1996).  More  recently,  offshoring  has  spread  from  the 
manufacturing  to  the  service  sector  (Amiti  and  Wei  2005),  generating  a  renewed  interest  among 
academics  (Krugman  1996,  Grossman  and  Rossi-Hansberg  2006,  Baldwin  2006,  Rodriguez-Clare 
2007) and raising fears among the general press.  
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The observed empirical effects of offshoring do not sit easily with simple partial equilibrium models 
that view one job shifted overseas as one job lost. For example, in both the US and Japanese cases, the 
widespread offshoring of manufacturing jobs that started in the mid-1980s was not accompanied by a 
general decline in manufacturing employment until the late 1990s (Debande 2006). As for Europe, 
Barba-Naveretti et al. (2006) report that Italian and French firms that invest in developing countries 
subsequently expand production and domestic employment. Likewise, two recent studies of micro data 
find that expansion of employment in affiliates in low-income countries raises the skill intensity of 
domestic production (see Head and Ries 2002 on Japanese data and Geishecker and Gorg 2004 on 
German data); Autor et al. (2003) and Spitz-Oener (2006) report that occupations are shifting from 
routine  to  complex  in  the  US  and  Germany,  respectively.
1 Understanding  such  effects  requires  a 
general  equilibrium  framework  where  wages,  prices,  production  and  trade  patterns  adjust  to 
offshoring. Responding to this need, some of the world’s best trade economists have put forth general 
equilibrium models of offshoring/fragmentation (e.g. Jones and Kierzkowski 1990).
2 As we argue in 
the sequel, these models can be viewed as a collection of insightful special cases. In addition, many of 
them have a complex structure that forced their authors to rely on numerical simulations to study their 
equilibrium properties. 
Viewing the production of goods (intermediate or final) as a ‘bundle of tasks’ (Autor et al. 2003, 
Baldwin 2006, Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg 2008) is helpful to understand the implications of the 
tradability of some tasks on factor rewards and how they differ from those of the tradability of goods 
and services. Traditional trade theory acknowledges the fact that, historically, domestic production 
factors were competing with foreign ones only indirectly—via trade in goods. In this paradigm, it 
could happen that the truck drivers and the call centre employees were working for the same sector, 
say a home PC delivery company. There was little wrong in ‘lumping’ the two tasks together as long 
as  one  could  be  fairly  sure  that  the  driving  and  call-answering  jobs  would  remain  bundled 
geographically. Put differently, it used to be the case that international competition was being felt 
almost exclusively at the sector-level (broadly defined), with all firms in a given sector being affected 
by import competition in a qualitatively similar way; ultimately, the Stolper-Samuelson theorem would 
provide a good guide as to which were the factors whose real reward would fall or rise as the result of 
trade. Recent technological breakthroughs in telecommunication technologies (as well as privatisations 
in the sector that allowed communication prices to fall substantially) rendered this view of the world 
incomplete making it important to look at the impact of globalisation on tasks in addition to sectors. As 
                                                
1 These developments are consistent with the adoption of skill-biased technologies, like IT (Autor et al. 2003), They are 
also consistent with offshoring (Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg 2008). In a model in which the purpose of organisations 
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Oener (2006).  
2 See e.g. Feenstra (1998) for a survey. 3 
pointed  out  by  Princeton  economists  Krugman  (1996),  Blinder  (2006),  and  Grossman  and  Rossi-
Hansberg (2006, 2008), ‘trade in tasks’ (a synonym for offshoring introduced by Grossman and Rossi-
Hansberg) differs from trade in goods in two important ways. First, workers in a specific task are 
directly facing competition from their foreign kin in the former case but indirectly in the latter. Second, 
the key distinction lies in the tradability of services–not in the level of education. This indicates that 
the list of offshore-able tasks is unlikely to line up with educational attainment as neatly as it has in the 
past. Specifically, though high-skilled workers’ real wages increased relatively to unskilled workers’ in 
developed countries as a result of trade in goods, some skilled workers will be adversely affected by 
trade in tasks whereas some unskilled workers won’t be directly affected. For instance, truck driving is 
completely unaffected by reduced international communication costs, while call centre services are 
highly affected. As we shall see, these subtle but crucial distinctions lead to amend well-known results 
in international trade theory 
Our model and preview of our contribution 
The purpose of our paper is to present a simple model of off shoring that allows us to examine its 
general equilibrium effects on wages, prices, production and trade patterns. The first main contribution 
of our exercise is that it allows us to develop necessary and sufficient conditions for signing these 
effects in source and host countries. Our baseline model finds firms in all sectors unbundling the 
production process and putting fragments of it abroad to take advantage of low-cost foreign factors of 
production. Importantly, our model avoids the analytic complexity of multi-cone models and factor-
intensity  reversals.  Non-factor-price-equalisation  exists  under  free  trade  due  to  Hicks-neutral 
technological  differences  among  nations.  Despite  the  resulting  effective  factor  price  equalisation, 
offshoring by the technologically advanced nation is cost-saving since offshoring firms can take their 
superior technology with them when they shift production abroad.
3 Since neither nation is specialised 
in production, our baseline model can be studied in the familiar setting of Jones (1965) and this allows 
us  to consider a  wide  range  of  effects  including  the  impact  of  offshoring  on  the  four theorem  of 
Heckscher-Ohlin-Vanek trade theory (Heckscher and Ohlin 1991, Vanek 1968). This is our second 
contribution. In particular, we show that offshoring is in many ways akin to shadow migration; it leads 
to intra-industry trade in a perfectly competitive, Heckscher-Ohlin-Vanek-like setting; and it is, by 
itself, a source of comparative advantage. 
The general equilibrium incidences on production, prices and wages are shown to be ambiguous in 
general and we characterise the factors that lead the ambiguity to resolve itself in one direction or the 
other. Importantly, we find that the factor owners of the offshoring nation are typically better off as a 
result of fragmentation (controlling for terms of trade effects); in other words, the welfare implications 
of trade no longer follow the standard Stolper-Samuelson logic and all factor owners might end up 
being  better  off  (as  also  pointed  out  by  Grossman  and  Rossi-Hansberg  2008).  This  is  because 
                                                
3 This assumption follows the Section 3.2 model in Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2008), August 2006 version.  4 
offshoring  allows  offshoring  firms  to  cut  on  costs  in  a  way  that  is  similar  to  factor-augmenting 
technological progress in the canonical Jones (1965). In a perfectly competitive environment, these 
savings are fully distributed to primary factor owners at the general equilibrium.  
We work with two main variants of the basic model. In the first, which we call the service-task case 
(mostly for terminological convenience) and which is similar to the case studied by Grossman and 
Rossi-Hansberg (2008), all offshored production is re-imported to the Home nation. In the second, 
which we call the goods-task case and which is original (to the best of our knowledge), local sales are 
possible in the sense that offshore production units can supply Foreign firms as well as Home firms. 
Our third contribution is to show that the gains from offshoring are shared between nations and factors 
within nations in the goods-task case, while Foreign wages are unaffected by offshoring in the service-
task case (apart from possible terms of trade effects). 
In  addition,  our  basic  model  set-up  is  rich  enough  to  permit  simple  extensions  that  address  the 
limitations of the model. First, it might be argued that foreign sourcing by Home firms will eventually 
make the superior technology of the offshored tasks spill over the Foreign firms. This case would be 
modelled in exactly the same way  as our ‘goods-task’ case mentioned  in the previous paragraph.  
Thus, we can give two interpretations to this variant of the basic model. 
Second, our model – as is common in the offshoring literature – is well suited to study North-South 
offshoring; however, most of the offshoring currently going on is probably among developed nations 
(Amiti and Wei 2005). A related concern stems from our use of the neoclassical paradigm, which sits 
uncomfortably  with  the  exclusiveness  of  technology  that  Home  firms  use;  if  Home  firms  own 
intangible assets like better management techniques, then we need a framework in which the concept 
of a ‘firm’ is at least better defined than in a constant-return-to-scale, perfect-competition framework. 
To address these concerns, we provide two simple model extensions. The first allows for two-way 
intra-industry offshoring. The second allows for offshoring in a monopolistic competition model where 
the notion of a firm is better defined than it is in the Walrasian setting (but comparison with the four 
Heckscher-Ohlin-Vanek theorems is less evident), though the issue regarding the boundaries of the 
firm is beyond the scope of this paper. 
To summarize, the contribution of our paper is threefold. First, in a way that complements Grossman 
and Rossi-Hansberg (2008), it integrates and generalises the results of a wide and diverse literature in a 
unified framework; in doing this, we are able to pinpoint the various channels and effects that lead to 
what might appear as a set of sometimes contradictory results. Second, we revisit the four canonical 
theorems of the Heckscher-Ohlin-Vanek paradigm in international trade. Most of our analysis works 
for a general number of sectors, factors and tasks. Third, we extend the model in a variety of original 
directions;  among  others,  we  study  the  wage  and  production  effects  of  offshoring  on  developing 
countries.  5 
Organisation of paper 
The  section  in  the  immediate sequel provides  an in-depth,  albeit  selective,  review  of  the  relevant 
literature; informed and hurried readers may skip it. Section 3 presents a simplified HOV model and 
briefly lays out the four standard trade theorems in order to fix ideas and introduce notation. The 
following section presents our model of offshoring, characterises the equilibrium, and then shows how 
offshoring requires a modification of the four standard trade theorems. Sections 5 and 6 present our 
extensions whereas section 7 discusses the normative implications of our theory. The final section 
presents our concluding remarks. An appendix provides necessary and sufficient conditions for the 
equilibrium  to  exist;  to  the  best  of  our  knowledge,  our  paper  is  the  first  to  do  so  in  the 
offshoring/fragmentation literature.  
2.  The literature 
In this section we review first the trade literature on offshoring and then (more selectively) the labour 
economics literature on routine tasks. 
Offshoring, fragmentation and trade in tasks 
Early on, Heckscher-Ohlin-Vanek theory saw a number of contributions that incorporated trade in 
intermediate  goods  (see  Batra  and  Casas  1973,  Woodland  1977,  Dixit  and  Grossman  1982  and 
Helpman 1984), but the most commonly cited reference in the offshoring/fragmentation literature is 
Jones  and  Kierzkowski  (1990).  The  Jones-Kierzkowski  paper  crystallised  the  insight  that 
fragmentation/offshoring can be thought of as technological progress and thus should be expected – as 
per Jones (1965) – to have complex effects. This line of modelling – which includes Jones and Marjit 
(1992), Arndt (1997, 1999), Jones and Findlay (2000, 2001), Jones and Kierzkowski (1998, 2000), and 
Jones, Kierzkowski and Leonard (2002) – is based on verbal and diagrammatic analysis (typically of 
small open economies) that assumes fragmentation occurs in only one sector and in one direction. See 
Francois  (1990a,  b,  c)  for  formal,  general-equilibrium  modelling  of  the  central  mechanism  in  the 
Jones-Kierzkowski fragmentation story in which the liberalisation of service links can promote the 
fragmentation of production blocks.
4  
The general equilibrium impact of Jones-Kierzkowski fragmentation varies according to the special 
case considered, with cases varying along three main dimensions: the factor intensity of the sector that 
is fragmented, the factor intensity of the process that is offshored, and the offshoring nation’s relative 
endowment. The Jones and Kierzkowski (1998) diagrammatic analysis yields examples that suggest 
two  important  insights  –  what  might  be  called  the  “Jones  ambiguity”  and  (with  some  abuse  of 
language)  the  “anti-Stolper-Samuelson  possibility.”  Using  a  pair  of  special  cases,  Jones  and 
Kierzkowski (1998) argue that workers whose jobs are “lost” to offshoring may see their wages rise in 
                                                
4 Francois (1990c) explicitly considers the impact of offshoring on the factor price equalization set.  6 
one  case,  but  fall  in  the  other.
5 The  “anti-Stolper-Samuelson”  insight,  which  stems  from  viewing 
fragmentation as technological progress, notes that freer offshoring/fragmentation – unlike freer trade 
in goods – need not produce winners and losers among factor owners.
6 In other words, the Stolper-
Samuelson logic establishes that the real reward of at least one factor of production must fall as a result 
of trade in goods; with trade in tasks, all factor owners may be better-off, hence our terminology. 
Contributions  that  study  the  price,  wage,  production  and  trade  effects  of  offshoring  in  explicit 
mathematical  models  include  Deardorff  (1989a,  b),  Venables  (1999),  Kohler  (2004a),  Markusen 
(2006), Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2006, 2008) and Antràs et al. (2006).
7 These papers present a 
gallery of  special cases that firmly establish the ambiguous sign of the general equilibrium price, 
production, trade and factor price effects. A linchpin issue facing all general equilibrium models in this 
literature  is  the  question  of  how  offshoring  can  be  cost-saving  when  international  trade  in  goods 
naturally leads to factor price equalisation. To address this issue, these papers work in models marked 
by non-factor price equalisation. Since non-factor price equalisation typically prevents utilisation of 
the elegant tools of Jones (1965), the analysis in these papers is quite complex. Most of these authors 
also assume that offshoring/fragmentation occurs in only one sector and only in one direction (to keep 
the analysis manageable). 
Deardorff (1989a,b) studies fragmentation in a range of explicit models using graphical analysis. The 
main formal analysis, however, concerns a HOV setting where cost-saving offshoring occurs since 
nations’ endowments are assumed to lie in different diversification cones (i.e. their endowments are so 
different  that  they  produce  no  goods  in  common  in  equilibrium).  Deardorff  (1989a)  argues  that 
fragmentation/offshoring may or may not foster factor price convergence. Working with Lerner-Pearce 
diagrammatic analysis of a general model with fragmentation in a single sector, he notes that “if you 
accept this argument, then such a move toward factor price equality is not at all assured. It depends 
crucially on … the factor intensities both of the fragments and of the original technology. There are 
many possibilities, including that relative factor prices move in the same direction in both countries 
and that they both move either together or further apart. (p. 14)” Necessary and sufficient conditions 
are not established. He then moves to explicit mathematical analysis using a 2-nation, 2-factor, many-
good,  multi-cone  HOV  model  with  Cobb-Douglas  tastes  and  technology.  He  derives  explicit 
expressions for relative factor prices in the two nations, showing that the wage ratios depend upon the 
national capital-labour ratios and national weighted average of the factor intensity of produced goods.  
Fragmentation changes the latter and can thus lead to a convergence or divergence of relative factor 
                                                
5 Referring to a HOV model with capital and labour, Jones and Kierzkowski (1998, p. 373) write: “the charge that if 
international trade causes a nation to lose a production activity which is intensive in the use of labour, it will cause the 
wage to fall, need not be true – especially for relatively capital-abundant nations.” 
6 Jones and Kierzkowski (1998, p. 380) write: “But even here the prognosis for a nation’s labour supply need not be 
gloomy, since such fragmentation tends as well to work like technical progress in raising the returns to all factors.” 
7 In  a different  vein,  Yi (2003)  emphasizes the  role  of  fragmentation to  reconcile the  empirically  large  and  growing 
elasticity of trade volumes with respect to trade barriers with the (relatively low) elasticity of substitution among broad 
categories of products as well as with the time series of measured average barriers to trade.   7 
prices (no expressions are given for the level of factor prices). The paper concludes by noting that “the 
effects on relative factor prices in the countries where the fragmentation takes place depend fairly 
systematically on the factor intensities of the fragments, as well as that of the original technology. 
What matters, however, is how these factor intensities compare to the average intensities of processes 
in use  in each country  before  fragmentation, not  their intensities compared  to all  goods  produced 
globally.” Necessary and sufficient conditions for relative factor price convergence are not derived but 
are implicit in the expressions.  
Venables (1999) works with a standard 2x2x2 HOV model and generates non-factor-price equalisation 
with a factor intensity reversal. Nations can thus have different factor prices without being specialised 
in production. As in the Jones-Kierzkowski tradition, fragmentation occurs in only one industry and 
offshoring  occurs  in  only  one  direction  (the  labour-intensive  segment  is  offshored  to  the  labour 
abundant nation). Using numerical simulations and Lerner-Pearce diagrammatic analysis, he concludes 
that “production fragmentation does not necessarily lead to convergence of factor prices,” and provides 
examples of both cases without developing necessary and sufficient conditions. The paper goes on to 
note that “fragmentation may change factor prices by changing the composition of Home exports, as 
well as imports” and that “it is possible to generate some curious cases in which it is the relatively 
capital intensive industry, not the labour intensive which leaves Home for Foreign” (curious since 
Home is capital-rich).  
Kohler (2004a) works with a specific factor model where fragmentation can only occur in one sector. 
Discussion  of  the  source  of  non-factor  price  equalisation  is  avoided  by  assuming  a  small  open 
economy where all goods prices and Foreign wages are immutably fixed (in the Jones-Kierzkowski 
tradition). The focus of the analysis is on the reward to the specific capital that moves offshore when 
fragmentation occurs, and the overall welfare effects on the small open economy.  
Markusen (2006) works with a 2x2x2 HOV model where one sector fragments, and he, like Deardorff, 
generates non-factor-price equalisation by assuming the two nations are in different diversification 
cones. Analytic results with multi-cone models are difficult (due to the inequality constraints), so the 
paper  studies  offshoring/fragmentation  via  numerical  simulations  based  on  the  complementary 
slackness approach. Fragmentation is assumed to occur in the skill-intensive sector and the offshored 
segment is assumed to be of middling skill-intensity. Offshoring therefore tends to increase the relative 
demand for skilled labour – and thus the skill premium – in both nations, but terms of trade effects can 
–  depending  upon  the  nations’  relative  sizes  –  reverse  this  direct  effect.  One  of  the  numerical 
simulations even shows the possibility of both factors losing in the offshoring nation (necessary and 
sufficient  conditions  are  not  established).  Another  simulation  shows  an  “anti-Stolper-Samuelson” 
result  whereby  the  skilled  workers  in  the  unskilled-labour-rich  nation  gain  from  offshoring  in  an 
absolute sense, but they gain less than their fellow unskilled workers. Markusen (2006) points out the 
limitation of the analysis: “In spite of doing countless runs of this model, I cannot guarantee that there 
are not other possibilities and, of course, reordering the factor intensities will change the results. What 
I can say is that it is easy to find ranges of parameters that generate these results, but we should all 8 
regard them as suggestive and not definitive.” The paper goes on to simulate four other models that 
vary in terms of the number of factors, the substitutability of factors in various sectors, and the factor-
intensity of the offshored process and offshoring sector. He then closes the paper by noting: “I view 
the paper as listing a number of plausible and empirically-relevant ways of modelling the offshoring of 
white-collar services…. Unfortunately, it is hard to offer robust conclusions.” 
Kohler (2004b) works with a small open economy where fragmentation/offshoring can only happen in 
one sector. He departs from other models, however, in using a radically different production structure 
–  that  of  Dixit  and  Grossman  (1982)  where  final  good  production  involves  of  continuum  of 
intermediate  stages,  each  of  which  requires  capital  and  labour.  The  production  stages  are  strict 
complements in that producing the final good requires each one to be performed in fixed proportions. 
At the cost of additional assumptions on the capital intensity of upstream versus downstream stages of 
production,  the  Dixit-Grossman  production  structure  yields  a  very  simple  characterisation  of  the 
endogenous range of stages that are offshored given an exogenously specified range of offshoring 
costs for each stage of production. The focus of his analysis is on establishing a ‘generalised factor 
price frontier’ that takes account of the shifts in the range of stages that are offshored when prices or 
offshoring costs change exogenously. When prices change, he shows that offshoring can heighten or 
dampen  the  magnification  aspect  of  the  Stolper-Samuelson  effects.  He  also  shows  that  cheaper 
offshoring produces more offshoring and this raises or lowers factor prices according to the relative 
factor intensity of the two sectors and the fragments offshored. No formal results are presented on 
production and trade effects.  
More recently, Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2006, 2008) – GRH for short – present a formal model 
where the wage effects of offshoring are unambiguous. GRH (2006), for example, highlights the case 
where offshoring unambiguously raises the wage of workers whose jobs are offshored (controlling for 
terms  of  trade  effects).  The  unambiguous  effect  is  driven  by  the  fact  that  offshoring  acts  as 
technological progress – what they call the productivity effect. Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2008) 
explore  the  issues  in  greater  depth,  confirming  the  unambiguous  productivity  effect  on  wages  in 
certain cases. GRH also identify an “anti-Stolper-Samuelson” effect. As they argue: “reductions in the 
cost of trading tasks can generate shared gains for all domestic factors, in contrast to the distributional 
conflict that typically results from reductions in the cost of trading goods. (GRH 2008, abstract)” GRH 
present  an array  of  models  to illustrate  their findings,  but  the common  core  of  their  models is a 
technological specification akin to the Dixit and Grossman (1982) model. Unlike Kohler (2004b), 
however, the stages (called ‘tasks’) require only unskilled labour (L-tasks) or only skilled labour (H-
tasks).  Substitution  between  the  L-task  and  H-task  continuums  is  possible,  but  L-tasks  are  strict 
complements in that producing the final good requires each task to be performed in fixed proportions; 
the same holds for H-tasks. Rodriguez-Clare (2007) embodies the Grossman-Rossi-Hansberg approach 
to trade in tasks in a Ricardian model à-la Eaton and Kortum (2002) to study the impacts of offshoring 
on wages in both rich (i.e. home) and poor (i.e. host) countries. Since this is a Ricardian model, there 
are no distributional effects within nations. Also, the world as a whole is better off thanks to the 
productivity/technological progress effect. However, the rich/home nations may be hurt because the 9 
terms-of-trade  effect  (which  redistributes  incomes across  nations)  is  necessarily  detrimental to the 
offshoring nations in this model. This is because the cost-saving induced by offshoring is reflected in 
goods prices – and as the production of the offshoring nation expands as a result, its terms-of-trade 
deteriorate. By contrast, the terms-of-trade effect is ambiguous in our HOV framework. 
Antràs et al. (2006, 2008) propose a model in which all tasks are potentially offshore-able. The accent 
in this paper is on the formation, composition and size of (cross-border) teams; workers have different 
abilities (skills); countries differ in the distribution of skills only (North’s first-order stochastically 
dominates  South’s).  Among  other  results,  they  show  that  improvements  in  the  communication 
technology yield larger teams and larger wage inequalities among production workers. Their model 
also provides a trade-induced explanation for the rise in the returns to skills. 
Offshoring, routine tasks and codification 
Which tasks are “offshore-able”? The OECD classifies offshore-able jobs as those characterised by 
four features: IT intensity, output that is IT transmittable, tasks that are codify-able, and tasks that 
require little face-to-face interaction. It classifies about 20% of the US workforce in as being offshore-
able.
8 In our view, a task can be offshored if two conditions are simultaneously fulfilled. The first 
condition is technological: communication costs must be low enough so that giving instructions to 
workers operating in distant countries is economical; the rise of the internet or the generalisation of the 
fibre optic cable and of satellite communications (developments that all dwarf the fall in transportation 
costs since WWII) contribute to make this technological constraint no longer binding. The second 
condition relates to the monitoring of agents; some tasks are easy to codify and it is also easy to verify 
whether the task has been performed according to the guidelines; assembly of a standard good is an 
example of such ‘routine tasks’.
9 By contrast, other tasks are complex (‘non-routine’). They require 
frequent  face-to-face  interactions  (‘non-routine  interactive  tasks’).  Only  part  of  the  information 
necessary to carry out these tasks travels easily inside fibre optic cables and physical and cultural 
distances are impediment to the tradability of such tasks. The routine versus non-routine terminology 
is borrowed from Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2006). They draw on a five-way division of the US 
labour  force  prepared  by  Autor,  Levy  and  Murnane  (2003)  from  highly  disaggregated  data, 
aggregating the Autor-Levy-Murnane categories into ‘routine’ and ‘non-routine’ tasks. 
Studying task changes within occupations, Spitz-Oener (2006) reports that occupations in Germany are 
more complex nowadays than in 1979. Crucially, Spitz-Oener (2006) reports “a sharp increase in non-
                                                
8 Bardhan and Kroll (2003) estimate that about 10% of the US labour force is employed in occupations that could be 
offshored; they include professions such as financial analysts, medical technicians, paralegals, and computer and math 
professionals. 
9 This second requirement is exposed clearly in Leamer and Storper (2001) who distinguish between ‘codifiable’ and ‘tacit’ 
information:  while  the  former  type  of  information  can  be  fully  described  using  words  or  symbolic  languages  and 
transmitted  via the fibre  optic cable, the telephone and  or other means, the transmission and  monitoring of the latter 
requires frequent face-to-face interactions. In other words, the former is technology-intensive whereas the latter requires 
mutual understanding that is trust-intensive and/or culture-intensive.  10 
routine  cognitive  tasks  …  and  a  pronounced  decline  in  manual  and  cognitive  routine  tasks…. 
Importantly, … most of the task changes have occurred within occupations, and they have been most 
pronounced in occupations in which computer technologies have made major headway.” Using less 
disaggregated US data, Autor et al. (2003) report that whole occupations also experienced greater 
complexity. As pointed out by Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2006, 2008), the trend reported by 
Autor et al. (2003) is consistent with both skill-biased technological change and import competition at 
the  task  level.  Spitz-Oener’s  paper  is,  to  the  best  of  our  knowledge,  unique  in  providing  direct 
evidence  that routine tasks have been displaced in a developed economy  at a very finely defined 
microeconomic level—the one that we address in this paper. 
3.  Trade in goods in a modified HOV model 
By way of introducing our notation and normalisations, we start by describing the familiar Heckscher-
Ohlin-Vanek (HOV) model following Dixit and Norman (1980), Leamer (1980), Trefler (1993) and 
others, and then state the four theorems. 
Free trade in goods in the two-country model 
Let  1,..., f F =  index factors (primary inputs) and  1,..., i I =  index industries (sectors). We work with a 
world  comprising  two  countries,  Home  and  Foreign,  and  variables  pertaining  to  Foreign  are 
subscripted with a star ‘*’ (variables pertaining to Home are subscript-free); aggregate variables are 
subscripted  with  a  ‘w’  for  ‘world’.  Thus  vectors  { } f w º w ,  { } i p º p ,  { } f V º V ,  { } i X º X  and 
{ } i M º M  denote, respectively, Home’s factor prices, good prices, factor endowments, production and 
imports; also, the I F ´  matrix  { } fi a º A  denotes Home’s technology with typical element  fi a  giving 
the cost-minimizing input requirement of factor f in industry i. Tastes are homothetic and identical 
across nations.
10 
Our first departure from the standard HOV model is the following: 
Assumption 1 (homothetic technologies).  * , 1 = < g g A A . 
That is,  Home  is assumed  to  be technologically  superior  in the  Hicks-neutral  sense  (Davis  1995, 
Trefler 1993); specifically, all Foreign unit input requirements are g > 1 times higher than Home’s 
(‘gamma’ is a mnemonic for ‘gap’). Note that the Hicks-neutral technology differences do not give rise 
to Ricardian motives for trade in our model. Indeed, we can mechanically transform the model into a 
standard HOV model by defining Foreign factor supplies in ‘effective units’, i.e. dividing 
*
f V  by the 
technological-inferiority-factor g. By the same token, define the vector of world factor endowment in 
                                                
10 Two further remarks are in order regarding notation: vectors and matrices are denoted by bold letters, whereas individual 
variables and parameters are denoted using italics. We also adopt the convention that Z > N means that each element of the 
matrix or vector Z is larger than the corresponding element of N (which requires that the dimension of Z is equal to the 
dimension of N). 11 
effective units as  */g º +
w V V V ɶ , where we use “~” to denote factor supplies measured in effective 
units. 
Let E and E* denote respectively Home and Foreign GDP (‘expenditure’) and let s denote Home’s 
share of world income,  *
w E E E º + , so  /
w s E E º . The HOV model with factor price equalisation 
and  homothetic  technologies  implies  s = -
w AM V V ɶ  (Heckscher-Ohlin-Vanek  theorem)  and 
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where Mf is Home’s import-content of factor f. Home is defined to be abundant in factor f if 
w
f f sV V < ɶ , 
so the HOV theorems predicts that Home imports the services of its scarce factors. Trade directly 
equalises good prices internationally; under some specific conditions (Assumption 2 below), trade also 
indirectly equalises factor prices (in effective units).  
The 2x2x2 model 
With appropriate qualifications, all the results we derive in this paper can be generalised to  , 2 I F ³ , 
but we sometimes streamline the exposition by working with the well-known 2x2x2 version of the 
HOV model.
11 To fix ideas, there are two types of labour, skilled labour K (or human capital) and 
unskilled labour L, and two industries/sectors, X and Y. We take X as the numeraire and let p denote 
the  price  of  Y.  Also,  let  w  and  r  be  the  rewards  for  unskilled  labour  (L)  and  skilled  labour  (K), 
respectively. Thus, in the version of the model with  2 I F = = , we write: 
1
, , , ,
LX KX
LY KY
a a w L X
a a r p K Y
         
º º º º º          
         
w p V X A  
Foreign is  relatively abundantly endowed with unskilled labour, which we  write as  * k k < , where 
/ k K L º  and  * */ * k K L º .  
Autarky, free trade and the 4 theorems  
In autarky, the Home or Foreign equilibriums are characterised by I pricing equations (one for each 
sector), F employment equations (one for each factor) and I good markets clearing condition.
12 Using 
linear algebra, the pricing equations in the two nations are summarised by:  
, * * = =g p Aw p Aw             (2) 
By the same token, the full-employment equations are (A
T denotes the transpose of A):  
                                                
11 See Dixit and Norman (1980) for an exhaustive treatment of the issues related to generalizing the results. 
12 One of these conditions is redundant by Walras’ law. 12 
, * * = =g
T T V A X V A X             (3) 
Together,  these  conditions  imply  that  factors  are  fully  employed  worldwide,  or =
w T w V A X ɶ ,  with 
* º +
w X X X . 
Let  ( ) (0,1) a × Î  denote the equilibrium expenditure share on Y (with Cobb-Douglas preferences a is a 
parameter).  Market-clearing conditions for Home in autarky are  pY E a =  and  (1 ) X E a = - ; these, 
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    (4) 
Let ki denote the relative skilled-to-unskilled labour intensity of sector i, with Y being the K-intensive 
good, so  Y X > k k , where  / i Ki Li a a º k ,  , i X Y = . We impose:  
Assumption 2 (diversification).  * Y X k k > > > k k               (5) 
so that neither nation fully specialises at equilibrium. Then inverting (2) and (3) yields the equilibrium 
wages and outputs: 
( ) ( )
1 1
, * , , * *,
g g
= = = =
-1 -1 -1 -1 T T w A p w A p X A V X A V     (6) 
and world output is  ( ) =
-1 w T w X A V ɶ . Autarky and free trade equilibrium factor prices, which follow 
from (6) and (4), are: 
* /(1 ) /(1 ) /(1 )
autarky: , * ; free trade:




LX LY X LX LY X LX LY X
k k k
p p p
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ɶ   (7) 
where  ( */ )/( */ )
w k K K L L g g º + + ɶ  is  the  world  skilled-unskilled  endowment  ratio  measured  in 
effective units. The non-specialisation regularity condition (5) implies that all endogenous variables 
are positive in equilibrium.  
FPE  theorem. The Factor Price Equalisation theorem states that free trade equalises factor prices 
internationally by equalising goods prices. Here the FPE theorem holds but for ‘effective’ units of 
factors, i.e. counting an hour of Foreign labour as 1/g times an hour of Home labour. From (6), the 
international ratio of wages in terms of the numeraire is g. 
                                                
13 Note that the p in the first equation is different from the p in the third one: in the former, it is the autarky price prevailing 
at Home whereas in the latter it is the terms-of-trade prevailing under free-trade. 13 
HOV theorem. The Heckscher-Ohlin-Vanek theorem states that the relatively L-rich nation exports 














ɶ             (8) 
where MX is our notation for Home imports of X. Since the denominator is positive (the world’s 
endowment is within the diversification cone), Home imports the L-intensive good if and only if its 
skilled-unskilled endowment ratio exceeds the world’s effective skilled-unskilled endowment ratio. 
This demonstrates the Heckscher-Ohlin-Vanek theorem since trade balance implies that the value of 
Home’s exports of Y equals -MX. 
We may also use (1) and (8) to get an expression for Home’s import of unskilled labour services (i.e. 
the factor content of trade), 
1 1 ( )( )( ) ( )
w w w
L Y X X Y M k k k k
- - = - - - - ɶ ɶ ɶ a k k k k , which is positive by (5). 
The Stolper-Samuelson theorem is a partial equilibrium result (p is exogenous) that connects goods 
and factor prices; a rise in the price of the K-intensive good raises r more than proportionally and 
lowers w. This can be seen from log differentiation of the solution for w and r in (6): 
/ /
0, 1
/ / / / KY KX LY LX
dw w p dr r p
dp p a a p dp p p a a
-
= < = >
- -
        (9) 
This means that r rises more than proportionally with p and w actually falls, so qualitatively the w and 
r changes are like real wage changes. (The inequalities follow from our factor intensity assumptions as 
usual.) 
The Rybczynski theorem is a partial equilibrium result (p is exogenous) which states, in its simple 
form, that a rise in a nation’s endowment of L raises its production of the L-intensive good more than 
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4.  A simple model of offshoring  
This section modifies the HOV model to allow for offshoring/fragmentation. We model the production 
of X as involving NX “tasks” labelled  1,..., { }
X t N Xt = , which can be thought of segments of the production 
process  (in  which  case  the  task’s  output  is  an  intermediate  good)  or  service  inputs.  Likewise,  Y 
production involves tasks Y1, …, YNY. In the HOV model, the tasks were bundled into aLX and aKX. 
Here we allow them to be unbundled and their production potentially placed abroad, i.e. offshored. 
Each task involves some L and K, so the  fi a ’s can be decomposed into task-by-task Leontief unit input 
coefficients:   14 
1 1
, ; 2
X X N N
LX LXt KX KXt X
t t
a a a a N
= =
º º ³ ∑ ∑  
where the L and K unit inputs for task-t in sector i denotes as  Lit a  and  Kit a . The coefficients for Y are 
decomposed into task requirements in an isomorphic manner. In the spirit of the HOV model, the 
international transportation of the fruit of each task is costless. In the spirit of Grossman and Rossi-
Hansberg (2008), some tasks may require only one type of labour, e.g.  0 LXt KXt a a > =  for some t and 
0 KX LX a a t t > =  for some  t t ¹ . 
A key to offshoring is our assumption that firms that offshore a task (i.e. place its production abroad) 
can combine their own nation’s technology with labour in the other nation, paying the local wage 
rather than workers’ marginal products.
14 In this way, offshoring from the high-technology/high-wage 
nation  to  the  low-technology/low-wage  nation may  be  economic  despite  the effective  factor  price 
equalisation.  Offshoring  from  the  low-technology  nation  to  the  advanced-technology  nation,  by 
contrast, will never be economic. One interpretation of this assumption is that Foreign workers are 
themselves  as  productive  or  as  well  educated  as  Home  workers  but  that  Foreign  technology, 
institutions or management practices are inferior to Home’s (Acemoglu et al. 2007, Bloom and Van 
Reenen 2007).  
While offshoring tends to reduce costs, it may not occur if the cost of coordinating spatially separated 
tasks is too great. To be explicit about the coordination costs and the nature of tasks, we assume that 
individual tasks are not equally easy to separate spatially from the other two tasks. We model the 
coordination costs as being of the iceberg type. That is, production of a unit of X1 by a Home firm in 
Foreign requires c(X1)aLX1 and c(X1)aKX1 units of L* and K*, where c(X1) ³ 1.
15 Note that it is as if 
offshoring  causes  deterioration  in  the  offshoring  firm’s  production  technology  (due  to  the  extra 
coordination costs).  ( ) Xt c  varies according to the task and, without loss of generality, we order the 
tasks such that task X1 is the cheapest to offshore, X2 the next cheapest and XNX the most expensive. 
We impose an isomorphic ordering on Y-sector tasks.  
The per-unit offshoring costs c relates to the cost of coordinating spatially separate tasks within the 
same firm. In addition, depending upon the nature of the task, it may be much harder to coordinate the 
N tasks when tasks are performed by different firms – especially when the task involves firm-specific 
services, many  of  which may  be  idiosyncratic,  such as accounting  services  (which involves firm-
specific  peculiarities)  or  telephone  help-lines  (which  involve  firm-specific  training).  While  it  is 
possible to model this decision more precisely, doing so would make it difficult to compare offshoring 
                                                
14 The concept of what constitutes a firm does not seat easily with our otherwise Walrasian model. Section 6 shows that our 
results all got through in a monopolistic competition trade model where firms are well-defined; we stick with the HOV 
setting to improve comparison with the four theorems and the main offshoring/fragmentation literature.  
15 Hence the monitoring/coordination costs are borne in foreign-labour units. This assumption is immaterial for our results, 
for we shall solve the model for c(.) Î {0,∞}. See footnote 18 below. 15 
with traditional trade in goods. This leads us to introduce an extra set of coordination-cost parameters 
that simplify the problem. It costs c(X1) to offshore task X1 to Foreign when tasks X2 through XNX are 
undertaken by the same firm in Home, but is costs z(X1) to coordinate the three tasks when task X1 is 
done in a separate firm from task X2 through XNX – and this regardless of whether they are undertaken 
in the same nation.
16 (The same holds for all the other tasks.) 
For the sake of analytic clarity, we consider two cases. The first case takes the z’s as sufficiently high 
to make inter-firm trade in tasks uneconomical. Thus even if Home firms offshore task X1 to Foreign, 
they will not supply task X1 to Foreign producers. The second takes the z’s as zero so inter-firm trade 
in tasks becomes economical. For the sake of terminological clarity, we refer to the first case (i.e. no 
local sale of offshored production) as offshoring of the service-tasks case (although it could also hold 
for the offshoring of some firm-specific intermediate goods) and the second case (i.e. local sales as 
economical) as manufacturing- or goods-tasks case. We study the former case in the remainder of the 
section; we address manufacturing-tasks in section 5.   
Deviation analysis: Service task offshoring 
To find conditions under which offshoring occurs, we examine the problem facing an atomistic Home 
X  producer  that  is  considering  offshoring  a  task,  when  no  offshoring  is  yet  occurring.  Since  no 
offshoring has occurred in this thought-experiment, but trade in goods is free, the analysis from the 
previous section implies that the low- and high-skill wage gap will be g (i.e. w = w*g and r = r*g). 
Offshoring is economical if: 
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where the first sum is the marginal cost of task Xt without offshoring and the second is the marginal 
cost with offshoring, i.e. when the Home firm uses Home technology but pays Foreign factor prices, 
taking account of the iceberg coordination costs. Plainly, task Xt is offshored only if  ( ) Xt g c > .  
Many cases can arise since the firm might want to offshore any subset of tasks 1,..., { }
X t N Xt = . To work 
through all of these, we would have to detail the coordination costs of each proposed bundle and this 
could be complex since coordination costs are unlikely to be separable. Since the purpose here is to 
illustrate the fact that offshoring (i.e. trade in tasks) leads to some outcomes that are very different than 
those  obtained  with  only  trade  in  goods,  we  discipline  the  range  of  cases  by  making  restrictive 
assumptions.  Specifically,  we  assume  that  when  trade  in  both  goods  and  tasks  is  allowed,  the 
                                                
16 Thus the decision to ‘make or buy’ a given task is left in a ‘black box’. The same is true about the boundaries of tasks. In 
the model developed by Garicano and Rossi-Hansberg (2006) and extended to an open economy by Antràs et al. (2006, 
2007), we may interpret the various layers of the hierarchies as various ‘tasks’. This way, their model provides some 
microeconomic foundations to the ‘boundaries of tasks’, i.e. as to what constitutes a task. In their model, a reduction in 
communication costs changes also the scope of each task. By contrast, we keep the boundaries of tasks t = 1, …, Ni 
exogenous in our model.  16 
coordination costs for X1 and Y1 are nil while the coordination costs of offshoring  2,..., { }
X t N Xt =  and 
2,..., { }
Y t N Yt =  are prohibitive. Thus, unless otherwise mentioned, we impose Ni = 2 throughout the rest of 
the paper, that is, there are two sets of tasks: those that are offshoreable and those that are not; this is 
without further loss of generality.  
Given this simplifying assumption, the atomistic Home firm would find it profitable to offshore task 
X1 to Foreign. Moreover, an atomistic Home firm in the Y sector would also find it profitable to 
offshore tasks Y1 to Foreign. Of course, other firms would follow and the re-organisation of work 
would  change  prices,  wages,  production  patterns  and  trade.  We  turn  to  working  out  the  new 
international equilibrium with free trade in both tasks and goods. Note that Foreign firms would never 
offshore to Home since this would involve combining inferior Foreign technology with expensive 
Home factors of production.  
Service task offshoring 
In the remainder of this section, as in section 3, the expressions written using linear algebra are general 
(in the sense that they usually hold for  , 2 I F ³ ). We often focus our discussion on the case with 
2 I F = =  to ease economic interpretation. Also, from now on we explicitly assume that the cost-
minimising  input-output  coefficients  are  fixed,  thus  the  results  we  derive  below  are  generically  a 
reasonable  first-order  approximation  by  the  envelope  theorem.
17 As  discussed  above,  we  roughly 
associate service-sector offshoring with the case where all offshore production is re-imported to Home 
because no X1 or Y1 can be sold to Foreign firms by assumption. Given that tasks X1 and Y1 are 
offshored, the new employment conditions are 
( ) , * = - = + g
T T T * T
1 O O χ 1 O V A A X V A X A X  
where the subscript ‘O’ (for ‘offshoring’) indicates equilibrium variables with offshoring,  1 { } fi a º 1 A  
and  1 1 { ( 1) } fi i a c º χA  define  the  unit  input  coefficients  of  the  tasks  being  offshored  from  the 
perspective of the home and host countries, respectively; more explicitly (in the 2x2x2x2 case):  
1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1
( 1) ( 1)
,
( 1) ( 1)
LX KX LX KX
LY KY LY KY
a a X a X a
a a Y a Y a
   
º º    
   
c c
c c
1 χ 1 A A  
The  difference  between  1 A  and  χ 1 A  results  from  the  iceberg  offshoring  costs.  Likewise,  the  new 
pricing equations are: 
                                                
17 Thus the loss of a generality is minimal. Interestingly, this specification allows us to derive sufficient conditions for the 
equilibrium to exist (see Appendix), which is non-existent in this literature. We also note that this simplifying assumption is 
frequent in the literature and many papers that relax this assumption consider marginal changes instead (e.g. Grossman and 
Rossi-Hansberg 2008).  Expressions that include flexible production become more convoluted but the effects we describe 
below still exist and generalise easily (details are available from the authors upon request). Conversely, looking at discrete 
changes allows us to uncover infra-marginal effects that are absent otherwise (for instance, offshoring e.g. L-tasks will 
entail a factor-saving effect that will also benefit factor K in general, unlike in e.g. Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg 2008).  17 
( ) , = - + =g
* *
O 1 O χ 1 O O O p A A w A w p Aw  
Note that the pricing equation for Foreign is unaltered by offshoring (Foreign firms continue to use 
Foreign technology and Foreign labour as before). In order to work with explicit solutions for X or w, 
we take the coordination costs to be zero, i.e.  ( 1) ( 1) 1 X Y c c = = .
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      (11) 
From these, it follows that offshoring implies that the countries have no-longer access to the same 
technology, so that inverting the zero profits conditions yields 
* /g ¹ 0 0 w w whilst summing Home and 
Foreign full employment conditions yields  ¹
w T
0 V A X ɶ . In particular, Home firms face the technology 
matrix A-A1 while Foreign firms continue to face gA. These considerations imply the following: 
Proposition 1. Offshoring implies that the FPE and the HOV theorems break down.  
Proof. The proof follows from (1). Start with the FPE theorem. Unless  1 (0,1): fi fi a a f f $ Î =  so that 
we can write  f = 1 A A  (i.e. a common fraction f of each  fi a  can be offshored), it is not possible to find 
a  real  number  (0,1) f Î ɶ  such that 
* : f f f w w f " = ɶ ,  i.e.  there exist  no  ‘effective  units’ so  that  factor 
prices can be considered to be equalised. Turn now to the HOV theorem. In the sense of (1), the HOV 
theorem holds only if the FPE theorem holds. A sufficient condition for the HOV theorem to hold 
under more general conditions is that the trading countries face the same technology. Inspection of 
(11) reveals that this is no-longer the case with offshoring. QED. 
Two implications  of this  proposition are  noteworthy. First, it implies that the K-abundant country 
might end  up importing  the K-intensive good for reasons that are conceptually different from  the 
exogenous  Ricardian  differences  suggested  by  Leontief  (1953)  and  confirmed  by  Trefler  (1993). 
Second, since offshoring changes the Home technology matrix but does not affect Foreign’s, we can 
no longer transform the equilibrium into free trade among nations with identical technology using the 
effective  labour  concept.  This  means  that  much  of  the  elegance  of  the  HOV  trade  equation  (8) 
disappears with offshoring, except in special cases. This is the main reason why the existing literature 
on  fragmentation/offshoring  is  so  fragmented:  solving  the  model  under  general  conditions  is 
technically not difficult but the outcome is so unwieldy that the cognitive cost of interpreting them is 
prohibitive.
19 However,  we  introduce  two  ‘tricks’  that  allow  us  to  move  forward:  we  show  that 
offshoring is in many ways analogous to factor migration and to technical progress.  
                                                
18 This is also in line with the spirit of standard neoclassical modelling whereby transaction costs are either prohibitive or 
zero.  
19 The result is a ratio of two expressions of the parameters of the model that contain tens of terms each, even after all the 
possible factorisations have been undertaken. 18 
Shadow migration and technical progress 
This offshoring-cum-tech-transfer acts like ‘shadow migration.’ Home firms use some Foreign L and K 
to produce goods using Home technology just as if the Foreign L and K migrated to Home and worked 
in the Home X and Y sectors (but got paid the foreign wages). We assume that the shadow migration is 
not  large  enough  to  move  ‘effective’  endowment  ratios  outside  of  the  diversification  cone,  so 
production remains diversified. The exhaustive set of necessary and sufficient conditions analogous to 
(5) is way too unwieldy to be revealing; however, the appendix provides a set of sufficient conditions 
that have a natural economic interpretation. Rearranging (11), the employment equations are: 
, , g º + = º - = =
T * T * w T w
O O O O O O V V  V A X V V*  V A X V A X ɶ       (12) 
with 
* 1
, , (1 ) .
g
º > º + = + - >
T w w
1 O 0 0 0 0  V A X 0 X X X V V  V V ɶ ɶ ɶ        (13) 
Above,  [ ]' L K º D D  V  defines the equilibrium amounts of the shadow migration, 
w
0 X  is the world 
output with offshoring and 
w
0 V ɶ denotes the world shadow effective endowments with offshoring. The 
definition of 
w
O V ɶ  makes it clear that offshoring is akin to an expansion in the world supply of factors 
(measured in effective units).
20 The shadow migration amounts, DL and DK, are positive. Shadow-
migration shows up in the price equations in (11) as cost-savings. For Home and Foreign: 
*
1 , ; ( ) g + = = º - >
*
O O O O O O p S Aw p Aw S A w w 0      (14) 
where  [ ]' X Y S S º S  and SX and SY are the per-unit cost savings in the X and Y sectors, respectively. 
Thus, offshoring is akin to factor-augmenting technological progress (Jones and Kierzkowsi 1990, 
Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg 2008). 
General equilibrium incidence on prices, wages, output and trade 
We turn now to determination of the post-offshoring prices, wages, output and trade flows.  
Price effects 
Solving (12) for 
w
O X  and 
w
















ɶ           (15) 
                                                
20 Thus, this shadow migration is conceptually quite different from the shadow migration implied by the factor-content of 
trade in final goods. Another difference between the two is that shadow migration implied by trade in tasks is one-way 
(from Foreign to Home) whereas implicit migration in the standard Heckscher-Ohlin framework is two-way (balanced 
trade).  Finally, the ‘shadow immigrants’ are being paid the wage prevailing in their country of origin, not the one in the 
host country. 19 
Comparing this to (7), we see that Y becomes dearer (pO > p), if and only if shadow migration lowers 
the world effective skilled-unskilled labour ratio, i.e. 
w w
O k k <
⌢ ɶ . From (12), 
w w
O k k <
⌢ ɶ  holds when the 
shadow L-migration is proportionally greater than shadow K-migration relative to the pre-offshoring 
world effective labour supplies, i.e. if  / /
w w L L K K D > D ɶ ɶ . To summarise (proof in the text): 
Proposition 2 (Terms of trade). Offshoring of either type of labour changes the world price of final 
goods.  The  relative  price  of  K-intensive  good  Y  rises  if  the  shadow  K-migration  is 
proportionally less than the shadow L-migration.  
Production effects 
From (12), (13) and  , : 0 fi f j a " " > , it follows that  >
w w
O V V ɶ ɶ   establishes that the world output must 
rise  in  at  least  one  industry  (precise  conditions  to  follow)  though  production  might  fall  in  some 
industries. More generally, combining the shadow-migration insight and Rybczynski logic, the general 
equilibrium incidence of offshoring on production are ambiguous in sign and depend upon the relative 
shadow  migration  of  L  and  K.  Solving  (11)  for  the  post-offshoring  production and  using  (6),  the 
production effects of offshoring are: 
1 1
( ) , * ( ) , (1 )( )
g g
- - - = = - = -
T 1 T 1 w T 1  X A  V  X A  V  X A  V    (16) 
where  
, * *, º - º - º -
* w w w
O O O  X X X  X X X  X X X  
and X and X* are defined in (6). This shows, as anticipated by the Rybczynski logic, that Home X 
output rises if DK/DL is lower than kY and Home Y output either rises less or falls. Let us illustrate this 
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The necessary and sufficient condition for Y output to fall is DK/DL < kX. From (16), the change in 
Foreign product has the opposite sign of the change in Home production effects, but the magnitudes 
are  mitigated  by  the  Foreign  technological  disadvantage  g.  Specifically,  * / X X g D = -D  and 
* / Y Y g D = -D . The various outcomes are depicted in the right-panel of Figure 1. The usual Jonesian 
magnification effects are in operation.
22 To summarise (proof in the text): 
                                                
21 Since the denominators are positive, the sign of the production effect turns on the difference between DK/DL and the k’s. 
Note that the production of at least one good must rise; the proof of this statement is by contradiction. Assume DX < 0 and 
DY < 0 both hold simultaneously; these imply kY < DK/DL < kX, which violates the ranking kY > kX.  
22 For example, DX/X ={(DL/L) /(1- k/kY) - (DK/K)/(kY/k-1)} and k/kY < 1 since both economies’ product is diversified.  20 
Proposition 3 (Shadow migration). Offshoring can be viewed as shadow migration of Foreign factors. 
The impact on Home production follows a Rybczynski-like pattern; the production of at least 
one good rises but the production of one good may fall if offshoring implies a very unbalanced 
migration of factors. Standard Jonesian magnification effects occur. 
Figure 1 about here 
As an illustration of this, the output of K-intensive good Y may fall if the ratio of K versus L shadow 
migration is low enough, but the output of both sectors would rise if the amounts of L and K shadow 
migration are fairly similar. The exact limits are shown in Figure 1. Changes in world production 
follow changes in Home production; more precisely: 
Corollary 3.1. World production of good Xi increases if (and only if) Home production of good Xi 
rises ( 1,..., i I = ). 
Proof. From (16), we may write 
1 (1 ) g
- = -
w  X  X , which establishes the result. QED. 
Wage effects  
From (14), it is clear that it cannot be that all Home factor prices fall (controlling for D D D Dp), though the 
reward  of  some  Home  factor  owners  may  fall.  Combing  the  cost-savings  aspect  of  the  shadow-
migration insight with Stolper-Samuelson logic, it is intuitive that the general equilibrium incidence of 
offshoring on wages is generally ambiguous. For example, if offshoring leads to a great deal of cost-
saving in the L-intensive sector – which acts like a rise in the price of X as per (14) – then w rises and r 
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with  O p p p D º - , and where w and  * w  are defined as in (6). This shows that the wage of Home L-
workers rises (controlling for terms of trade effects Dp), if and only if the cost-saving is sufficiently 
greater in the L-intensive sector than in the K-intensive sector. Using well-know solutions for (18) (see 
Jones 1965), the precise necessary and sufficient condition is  / / X Y KX KY S S a a > . Additionally, r rises 
less or actually falls. The necessary and sufficient condition for r to fall (controlling for terms of trade 
effects), is that the ratio of cost-savings exceeds the ratio of L-input coefficients,  / / X Y LX LY S S a a > . If 
the cost-savings ratio lies between the skilled-unskilled endowment ratios, then both wages may rise. 
Figure  1  (left  panel)  illustrates  the  possibilities.  The  usual  Jonesian  magnification  effects  are  in 
operation.   21 
Apart from possible terms-of-trade effects, there is no change in the foreign wages as Foreign goods 
are produced with the unchanged Foreign technology.
23 To summarise (proof in the text): 
Proposition 4 (Cost saving). Controlling for terms of trade effects, offshoring raises the real wage of 
Home L-workers if the offshoring implies cost savings that are sufficiently larger in the L-
intensive sector than in the K-intensive sector; the real wage of K-workers rises less or actually 
falls; it falls if the cost-savings are sufficiently skewed towards the L-intensive sector. The 
precise necessary and sufficient conditions are illustrated in Figure 1. Apart from terms of trade 
effects, wages of Foreign L- and K-workers are unaffected.  
Notice that shadow migration can widen or narrow the international wage gap for each type of labour, 
so offshoring may increase or decrease the pressure for real migration. In this sense, shadow migration 
need not be a substitute for real migration.  
Rent allocation 
The cost savings arises from the use of Home’s superior technology with Foreign’s cheap labour. This 
creates rents (Foreign workers in the offshoring sector are paid their reservation wage rather than their 
average product) that accrue entirely to Home in the services-version of our offshoring model. The 
sectoral bias in the cost-savings determines how much of these rents go to Home L-workers as opposed 
to Home K-workers. This can be seen explicitly by writing (18) in terms of the Home-Foreign wage 
gaps using the definitions of S in (14): 
1( ) º - = - +
-1 * -1
O O O  w w w A A w w A  p 
The first term on the right-hand side of this expression shows that the division of rents between Home 
L- and K-workers depends upon the relative labour savings in the X and Y sectors. The second term 
illustrates  that  Home  factors’  rewards  also  depend  on  the  change  in  the  terms-of-trade  D D D Dp  (what 
Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg 2008 call the ‘relative-price effect’). 
Extreme offshoring 
One interesting special case is where the coordination costs for all tasks are zero (all c’s are unity). In 
this case, all tasks are offshored (potentially) and Home’s superior technology completely displaces 
Foreign technology (all Foreign labourers work in the offshoring sector). The outcome is exactly like a 
technology transfer from Home to Foreign that brings the Foreign economy to the technology frontier. 
In this extreme case, Home wages are unchanged (controlling for terms of trade effects) but Foreign 
wages rise to Home levels. This tells us that the wage-offshoring relationship is thus non-monotonic. A 
modest lowering of coordination costs produces offshoring that raises incomes in the advanced-nation 
                                                
23 If offshoring involves a relatively large amount of shadow L-migration versus shadow K-migration, the price of the L-
intensive goods will fall, as per (15); this implies a negative terms of trade effect for Foreign, so Foreign L-workers would 
lose and Foreign K-workers would gain according to standard Stolper-Samuelson reasoning.   22 
(as per Proposition 4), but a very large reduction could return them to the pre-offshoring level, while 
raising the backward nation’s factor prices to those of the advanced nation. 
Inter-industry and intra-industry trade effects 
Home imports of X are (1-a) times its GDP minus its production of X. In the offshoring equilibrium, 
(1 ) XO O O M E X a = - - , so we can express the change in imports in terms of the change in Home’s 
GDP and its production of X, i.e.  (1 ) X XO X M M M E X a D º - = - D -D . Since the impact of offshoring 
on E is driven by factor price changes – and thus SX and SY as per (18) – while its impact on X is driven 
by DL and DK as per (16), offshoring changes the pattern of trade in final goods (apart from knife-edge 
cases).  For example, if the shadow migration is  heavily biased towards K (so the impact on  X is 
negative) and the per-unit cost-saving is heavily biased towards Y (so the wage of Home’s abundant 
factor rises) then Home’s imports of X will rise. More precisely, we calculate DE (which equals LDw+ 
KDr) from (18) and DX from (17) to get: 
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Plainly this depends upon the sectoral cost-saving (S) and shadow migration (DK and DL) in complex 
ways. Thus offshoring alters the pattern of trade in final goods. To summarise:  
Proposition 5 (Comparative advantage). Offshoring is a ‘source of comparative advantage’ in that it 
alters the pattern of trade in final goods.  
For instance, if Home and Foreign have identical endowments ratios there would be no HOV motive 
for  trade  without  offshoring,  but  trade  in  final  goods  can  arise  due  to  the  ‘shadow  migration’ 
associated with offshoring. Recall that Home firms face the technology matrix A-A1 while Foreign 
firms face gA, thus in this sense offshoring creates a form of Ricardian comparative advantage in final 
goods. 
If one uses aggregated data, some trade would be measured as Intra-industry trade (IIT). Indeed, IIT 
arises with offshoring if statisticians classify the output of tasks X1 and Y1 as X-sector and Y-sector 
trade, respectively. Home imports the fruit of tasks X1 and Y1. Since Home also exports either or both 
of final goods, intra-industry trade must arise. To summarise: 
Proposition 6 (IIT). Offshoring typically creates intra-industry trade since Home imports the fruit of 
the offshored task X1 and Y1 and is, typically, a net exporter of either X or Y even if Home and 
Foreign have identical factor endowments.  
Proof. A standard measure of the volume of intra-industry trade is the ‘overlap’ of a country’s import 
and exports within a given sector. Denoting ‘IIT’ as our measure of intra-industry trade and writing 




X iO fi f f M X a w º ∑ , we get (for  2 I =  and thus  , i X Y = ): 23 
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QED. 
Trade in tasks and the 4 theorems 
The effective FPE theorem described above involved a pre- and post-trade comparison of wages in the 
absence of offshoring. Offshoring, in general, breaks the effective factor price equalisation since it 
changes Home wages. Moreover, the direction of causality goes both ways. Offshoring, which arises 
because the wage gap creates opportunities for arbitrage, widens the international wage gap (for at 
least one type of labour and possibly all of them as per Proposition 4) and thus creates extra trade.  
The HOV theorem links trade in goods to relative factor endowments. It does not necessarily hold 
when there is free trade and offshoring. For instance, if nations have identical factor endowment ratios, 
free trade and offshoring would result in inter-industry trade when the HOV theorem would predict 
none.
24 By opening a gap between effective and actual endowments, offshoring may also lead to a 
Leontief-like paradox (the L-abundant nation might become a net exporter of the K-intensive good as 
per Proposition 5).  
The correct version of the HOV theorem in our model is rather involved. Since Home GDP is the 
output  of  final  goods  less  the  cost  of  imported  intermediates  -
*
O O p X w  V ,  we  can  use  the 
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The first term is isomorphic to the standard HOV theorem formulation as in (8), except we use the 
shadow rather than the actual relative endowments (in effective units). The second term is proportional 
to two endogenous quantities that might be observable – the total wage bill in the offshoring sector in 
Foreign, and the value of Home’s imports of intermediates (all in terms of the numeraire). The closed 
form solution for 
* *
O O w L r K º D + D
*
O w  V , employing the definitions of D D D DV in (13), the solution for 
*





* -1 T T T -1
O O 1 1 w  V A p A A A V  
                                                
24 Depending upon the factor intensity of the offshored tasks, the data might be marked by a ‘missing trade’ paradox, i.e. it 
might show less net trade than predicted by the HOV theorem as in Trefler (1995), but equally well there might be ‘too 
much’ net trade.  24 
Combining these elements and using the two-sector definitions of  O p  and V, the HOV theorem with 
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where pO is defined in (15). Plainly this is far more complex that the usual HOV theorem. The reason 
is  that  offshoring  alters  the  relative  technology  matrices  in  ways  that  prevent  us  from  using  the 
effective-labour  concept  to  cleanly  restate  the  equilibrium  as  trade  between  nations  with  identical 
technology.  
The Stolper-Samuelson theorem is a partial equilibrium result linking factor and goods prices. In the 
partial equilibrium spirit, we take the extent of offshoring – as measured by S – to be exogenous when 
formulating the equivalent theorem for the case of free trade in tasks and goods. Inspection of (18) 
shows that the theorem would be unaltered for Foreign, but the transmission of changes in p to Home 
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Comparing this to (9), we see that the impact on w would be dampened (less negative) and the impact 
on  r  would  be  magnified  (more  positive),  if  and  only  if  wO  rises  and  rO  falls  with  offshoring 
(controlling for terms of trade effects). As we know from the discussion above, a necessary condition 
for this to be the case is that the relative cost-saving is skewed towards the L-intensive sector so that 
/ / X Y LX LY S S a a > , as per Figure 1.  
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Comparison of this and (10) provides two main results. First, under the assumption that offshoring 
does not reverse the ranking of relative factor intensities, the proportional increase in X from a given 
proportional increase in L would be smaller under trade in goods only, but the drop in Y production 
would be more marked, if and only if XO > X and YO < Y; for these conditions to hold, it is sufficient 
that  / X K L k > D D .  If  / Y K L k D D > ,  then  the  proportional  increase  in  X  is  more  marked  and  the 
proportional drop of Y would be dampened. Second, if as a result of offshoring X becomes skilled-
labour intensive, then the output of X decreases as a result of an increase in L by the usual Rybczynski 
logic. To summarise (proof in the text): 
Proposition  7  (Offshoring  and  the  four  theorems).  Offshoring  alters  the  four  HOV  theorems.  In 
particular, shadow migration implies that the sign and volume predictions of the HOV theorem 25 
violate the theorem based on actual endowments. The same can be said for the factor price 
equalisation theorem since the extra trade induced by offshoring tends to widen international 
factor price gaps. The Stolper-Samuelson and Rybczynski theorems would also appear to be 
violated in their strict forms although properly modified versions of the theorems hold.  
Integrating special cases in the literature 
The fragmentation/offshoring literature has focused on special cases. Many of the papers assume that 
offshoring occurs in only a single sector while others present cases where offshoring only involves a 
single factor. Here we illustrate how our offshoring model can integrate the various cases. To keep our 
synthesis manageable, we limit our focus to Home wage effects and ignore terms of trade effects. 
From (18): 
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In the papers that assume only one sector experiences fragmented/offshoring (so min{ , } 0 X Y S S = ), 
offshoring acts like sector-specific Home technical progress, so the wage changes (ignoring terms of 
trade effects) are simple and the “Jones ambiguity” (see Section 2) arises. If offshoring/fragmentation 
occurs only in the unskilled-labour intensive X-sector, then SY = 0 and Home unskilled wages rise, but 
w falls if offshoring occurs only in the Y-sector. Likewise, r rises and w falls if the offshoring occurs 
only in the skilled-labour intensive sector.  
In papers where offshoring involves only one factor, offshoring acts like a factor-specific cost saving 
and the well-known GRH result that offshoring unambiguously boosts the wage of workers’ whose 
jobs are offshored (controlling for terms of trade effects) can arise.  GRH (2006) assume production 
functions where each task uses only L-labour or only K-labour and they undertake most of the analysis 
assuming that only L-tasks are offshored.
25 In this case,  
*
1( ) X LX O O S a w w = -  and 
*
1( ) Y LY O O S a w w = - , 
so: 
* * 1 1 1 1 ( / ) ( / )
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Due to GRH normalisations involving the size of tasks and the equality of offshoring costs across 
sectors, the numerator of Dr is zero, while Dw is positive.
26 GRH (2008) also consider the case where 
                                                
25 GRH (2006) focus exclusively on the case where only tasks involving L can be offshored; GRH (2008) also consider the 
possibility that tasks involving K can be also be offshored. The main restriction in their formal analysis in both papers is 
that every task is performed only by L or only by K.  
26 GRH (2008) normalize the measure of a task so that L-tasks in both industries all have the same unit input coefficients, 
i.e. aLX1 = aLY1, in our notation. They also assume that the offshoring cost for the tasks that have been thus normalised are 
identical across sectors (i.e. tx(i) = ty(i) = t(i) in their notation). This interaction between the normalisation of task ‘sizes’ 
(formally, their measure) within each sector and the cross-sector assumption on offshoring costs implies that the labour 
cost-saving in both sectors is proportional to the pre-offshoring unit-labour input coefficient, which, in our notation implies 26 
tasks that involve only K-labour can also be offshored and in this case SX and SY regain their general 
formulation as in (14), so the Jones ambiguity is restored as per Proposition 3.  
5.  Manufacturing task offshoring  
In the previous section, all output of the offshored sector was ‘sold’ to Home even though offshored 
production units produce tasks X1 and Y1 at a lower cost than the Foreign producers. Here we allow 
local sales of X1 and Y1. For the sake of terminological clarity, we refer to this case (where the z’s are 
zero) as the ‘manufacturing goods case’ even though it could apply to some types of services. As we 
mentioned in the introduction, this version of the model also captures ‘long run’ technology spillovers 
brought about by FDI: local Foreign firms might ‘learn’ from the presence of Home multinational 
firms producing tasks X1 and Y1 in their home country and close the technology gap on those.  
When inter-firm coordination costs z(X1) and z(X1) are zero, the offshoring Home firms would also 
supply X1 and Y1 to Foreign producers. This would change the pricing and employment equations to: 
, * ; , g g + = + = + = + =
* T T *
O O O O p S Aw p S Aw V  V A X V*  V* A X     (19) 
where the subscript ‘O’ indicate the new offshoring equilibrium (i.e. we ‘reset’ the notation, so the 
value of these endogenous variables differs from those in previous sections), and  
( ), * ( 1) ; , ( 1) . g g = - = - = = - + -
* * T T
1 O O 1 O 1 O 1 O S A w w S A w  V A X  V*  V A X  (20) 
Note that S, S*, D D D DV and D D D DV* are different from the previous section (in particular, S* was equal to 
zero and D D D DV* was equal to minus D D D DV). Solving (19) for wages and using (6) yields: 
1
( ), ( )
g
- - = + + = + +
1 * 1
O O w w A S  p w w* A S*  p       (21) 
where  D D D Dp  denotes  pO  –  p  as  before.  Two  aspects  of  this  expression  are  noteworthy.  First,  the 
expression for Home factor prices is isomorphic to (18) so our analysis in the service-offshoring case 
in the previous section also applies in this model extension (although the exact values of SX and SY may 
change since the Foreign factor prices can be different). Second, the wages of Foreign workers also 
benefit from the cost-savings  induced by the offshoring-linked  technology transfer (the exact per-
sector cost saving is given by 
*
X S  and 
*
Y S ). There is a crucial difference, though, between the factor 
price effects on Home versus Foreign labour. For Home labour, it is rents that generate the cost-
savings  (i.e.  the  fact  that  Foreign  workers  are paid  less  than  their average  products);  for  Foreign 
labour, technology transfer is the source of the cost-savings. Moreover, the Foreign wage changes in 
(21) are isomorphic to those of Home. Consequently, all the detailed analysis in the previous section 
                                                                                                                                                                
aLX1/aLX = aLY1/aLY.  Footnote 12 in GRH (2008) suggests that aLX1 = aLY1 could be relaxed  by allowing  more general 
substitution among tasks but the mapping to offshoring costs in this a case is not made explicit. 27 
relating the cost-savings to the wage effects (e.g. Proposition 4 and Figure 1) is applicable to the 
impact of offshoring on Foreign wages with 
*
X S  and 
*
Y S  substituted for SX and SY.  
Solving (19) for production and using (6) yields: 
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Qualitatively, the impact on Home production is the same as in the service-offshoring case in the 
previous section. The impact on Foreign production, however, is qualitatively different and the shadow 
migration interpretation is less clear-cut – note in particular that the signs of DL* and DK* are now 
ambiguous, though effective world endowments of L and K are unambiguously larger with offshoring, 
i.e.
w w
O L L > ɶ ɶ  and 
w w
O K K > ɶ ɶ  (to see this, note that (19) implies  ( ) ( )/g = + + + º
T w w
O O A X V  V V*  V* V ɶ  
and  (20)  implies  /g + >  V  V* 0 ,  or  >
w w
O V V ɶ ɶ ).  In  the  service-offshoring  case,  Home  offshored 
technology that was used only for Home production, so the Foreign labour employed in the offshoring 
sector was diverted from Foreign production and this meant that the Foreign production change was 
proportional to the Home production effect but of the opposite sign ( * g = -  X  X). Here the tech-
transfer embodied in offshoring tends to stimulate Foreign production, so this simple proportionality 
breaks down. Nevertheless, the basic analysis of production effects for Foreign follows the reasoning 
of Proposition 3 and Figure 1 with D D D DX
* substituted for
 D D D DX. 
Since  the  trade  effects  follow  from  the  production  and  factor  price  changes,  as  per  the  reason 
surrounding Propositions 5 and 6, it is clear that offshoring in the goods-case at hand will also be a 
source of comparative advantage and intra-industry trade. To summarise (proof in the text): 
Proposition 8 (Manufacturing task offshoring). Assume manufacturing offshoring instead of service 
offshoring.  Then  all  the  qualitative  effects  regarding  trade  effects  as  well  as  wage  and 
production effects in Home remain unaltered. By contrast, Foreign production and wages are 
affected by offshoring in a way that is similar to Home production and wages. 
6.  Extending the basic model  
In  this  section,  we  extend  the  basic  trade-in-tasks  model  in  two  directions.  First,  we  allow  for 
Ricardian differences among nations and show that this can result in the two-way offshoring that is 
common among OECD nations (Amiti and Wei 2005). Second, we show that the basic analysis in 
Section 4 goes through in a simple trade model à la Helpman and Krugman (1985). This may be useful 
since some of the coordination-cost assumptions in our offshoring model fit more naturally in setting 
where firms produce differentiated product (and thus naturally have differentiated inputs).  28 
Intra-industry two-way offshoring
 27 
To  focus  on  the  essential  differences  between  trade  in  goods  and  tasks,  it  proved  convenient  to 
eliminate Ricardian motives for trade by assuming that the international technology differences were 
of the Hicks neutral type. One result of this assumption was that Foreign never offshored tasks to 
Home. The extensive empirical literature on fragmentation, however, documents the importance of 
two-way offshoring. Here we modify the basic model in a way that creates two-way, intra-industry 
offshoring in spirit akin to Davis (1995). We shall do so in a highly specific model. As the analysis 
above made clear, there are a wealth of cases that could be considered (e.g. various combinations of 
factor abundance and technology superiority, factor intensity of the offshored tasks, etc.). However it 
is not really necessary to formally consider all the cases. Most of the cases can be dealt with simply 
using the core intuition that trade in tasks can be viewed as ‘shadow migration’.  
We assume ‘mirror image’ Ricardian superiority. For the purposes of this subsection, we take N=3, 
namely, there are three sets of tasks. Home has inferior technology in tasks X3 and Y3, while Foreign 
has inferior technology in tasks X1 and Y1. The nations have identical technology in tasks X2 and Y2. 
Moreover, we assume that the task-level technological advantages exactly offset each other so that the 
two nations have the same sector-level unit input coefficients. Formally, let the input-output matrices 
be  { } fi b º B  and 
* * { } fi b º B  (with  , f L K =  and  , i X Y =  in  the  2x2x2  case).  We  assume  that  the 
technological edges in tasks 1 and 3 are such that: 
* *
1 2 3 3 1 1 2 3 , , , 1; , , , , 1,3 fi fi fi fi fi fi fi fi fi fi t b a a a b a a a b b f K L i X Y t g g g º + + º + + = > = = =  
so B*=B. Finally, we assume nations have the same factor endowment ratios, or V = mV*, some m >0.  
Given the analysis above, the outcome without offshoring (i.e. trade in tasks) is obvious. The two 
nations have identical wages and do not trade with each other, i.e.: 
*; , * *, ; . = = = = = =
T w w p Bw Bw V B X V BX V BX M 0       (22) 
Once we allow free offshoring – i.e. the coordination costs, the c’s and the z’s, drop to unity – trade in 
tasks  occurs.
28 Specifically,  Home’s  superior  technology  in  tasks  X1  and  Y1  completely  displaces 
Foreign’s technology in these tasks while Foreign’s superior technology in tasks X3 and Y3 completely 
displaces Home’s technology. In this case, offshoring (and the fact that tasks can be sold at arm’s 
length among firms since the z’s are unity) implies that both nations move to the technology frontier. 
As a result, the pricing and production equations are: 
; , , = = = = =
* T T * w T w
O O O O O O p Aw Aw V A X V* A X V A X     (23) 
                                                
27 We would like to thank Toshi Okubo for providing the idea for this section. 
28 Note  that,  since  wages  are  equalised,  this  case  makes  sense  only  if  we  consider  the  case  of  ‘manufacturing-task’ 
offshoring. 29 
where  1 2 3 fi fi fi fi fi a a a a b º + + <  and  the  subscript  ‘O’  indicates  two-way  offshoring  equilibrium 
variables (i.e. we have ‘reset’ the notation so these endogenous variables differ from those in previous 
sections). Since B>A holds by construction, it follows from (22) and (23) that wages have risen by 
( ) = - + O B w B A w  p  (controlling for terms-of-trade effects). By the same token, world effective 
endowments have risen. To see this, let  º
w T w
O O V B X  so that  ( ) º - = - >
w w w T T w
O O  V V V B A X 0 holds 
by (22) and (23); as a result, (world and domestic) production of at least one of the final goods has 
risen, too. As usual, by the Stolper-Samuelson and Rybczynski logics, the effect on individual wages 
and individual industry output are ambiguous. In symbols: 
[ ] , [ ( ) ] = - + = -
-1 -1 T -1
O O  w I B A w B  p  X I B A X  
where  I  is  the  identity  matrix.  The  interpretation  of  these  expressions  revolves  around  the  same 
considerations as in Section 5. Expressions pertaining to Foreign are isomorphic. 
The production effects are simple to work out. The two-way offshoring is like ‘shadow migration’ into 
each  country  but  due  to  the  symmetry  we  imposed,  there  is  no  net  shadow  migration  between 
countries. By contrast, the move of both nations towards the technology frontier as a result of two-way 
offshoring will be isomorphic to a labour saving productivity improvement in both sectors in both 
nations. Given the ex ante symmetry of the nations at the sector level and the ex post symmetry of the 
nations at the task level, there is no trade in final goods either before or after free offshoring. With 
offshoring, all trade is intra-industry trade in tasks. If the tasks represent manufacturing stages, this 
would be parts and components trade. If they are service inputs, this would be intra-industry services 
trade.
29  
Offshoring in a Helpman-Krugman trade model 
A fact that has been well appreciated in the literature since Norman (1976) and Helpman and Krugman 
(1985)  is  that  the  basic  HOV  results  carry  through  unaltered  in  a  Dixit-Stiglitz  monopolistic 
competition setting provided that technologies are homothetic.
30 Here we use this insight to show that 
the Section 4 analysis could easily be conducted in a monopolistic competition trade model setting. 
Such a setting has the merit of making firm-level variables better defined but the demerit of reducing 
comparability with the classic HOV model.   
The key to the Section 4 analysis lies in the pricing and employment equations and their restatement 
using the shadow migration insight. As is well known, the free-entry output of a typical variety under 
monopolistic competition (MC) with homothetic technologies is parametrically fixed at F(s-1), where 
                                                
29 This is consistent with the evidence in Schott (2004) insofar as we observe two-way trade at finely disaggregated levels 
and that the differences in productivity at the task level are re-interpreted as differences in the quality of the fruit of the 
task. 
30 A ‘bundle’ of i-sector factors uses aLi and aKi units of L and K, respectively. The fixed cost involves F bundles and the 
marginal cost involves 1 bundle in each sector i = X,Y. 30 
F is the fixed entry cost and s is the elasticity of substitution.
31 This implies that MC sectors display 
constant returns at the sector level (doubling sectoral output at equilibrium would require double the 
inputs).  Equally  well-known  is  Dixit-Stiglitz  MC’s  constant  mark-up  pricing  which  makes  prices 
proportional to marginal costs. These two facts imply that the MC pricing and employment equations 
differ only slightly from those of the HOV model in Section 3. Specifically, assuming Dixit-Stiglitz 
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The Foreign pricing and employment conditions are isomorphic.  
Since we have not specified units for the elements of X or V, we are now free to choose units such that 
the coefficient, s/(s-1), is absorbed into the definitions of prices and endowments. With this, we have 
reduced the problem to the one solved in Sections 4 (service-task case) and so can conclude that the 
relevant Propositions among Propositions 1 to 8 also hold in this model.  
7.  Welfare 
What are the gains from offshoring? How are the usual gains from trade in final goods affected by 
trade in tasks? These are the two questions this section seeks to answer. Before doing so, it is worth 
noting that there is no market failure in the neoclassical model of sections 3 to 5, so in general it must 
be the case that the world as a whole is better off as a result of trade in tasks: indeed, offshoring 
enables a subset of Foreign workers to replace their domestic, inferior technology with Home’s, and as 
a result the world production possibility frontier expands.  
Gains from trade in tasks 
Consider first the gains from trading tasks, controlling for the trade in final goods (i.e. impose D D D Dp = 0 
for the time being). First, as we noted above, world’s production possibility frontier shifts out as the 
result of (at least some) Foreign workers conveying tasks X1 and Y1 using Home’s better technology. 
In effect, world endowments of L and K increase as per (13) as a result of shadow migration. In turn, 
world output of either X or Y (or both) must increase, as per (12) and Figure 1 (left panel). A direct 
implication of this result is that, all else equal, real factor rewards are generally larger under offshoring 
than under trade in goods alone. To see this, turn first to the model of section 4 (service offshoring); as 
is obvious from (14) and Figure 1 (right panel), nominal wages of Home skilled or Home unskilled 
workers (or both) increase; given our choice of numeraire, real changes are nominal changes with Dp = 
                                                
31 Let x denote output and v denote marginal cost. Free entry requires that the price, which is vs/(s-1), equals average cost, 
which equals v(1+F/x); solving for x yields the result in the text. 
32 The equilibrium output per firm in both sectors is F(s-1), so the per-firm demand for factor bundles (including the 
demand for the fixed cost) is x = Fs. Since X-sector output is just nx where n is the mass of X-firms, n = X/F(s-1), total X-
sector labour demand is a aLX(F+x)n, which equals aLX(s/(s-1))X. Similar expressions hold for the other labour demands. 31 
0  .  In  the  model  of  section  5  (manufacturing  task  offshoring),  Foreign  workers’  nominal  wages 
increase as a result of trade in tasks if, and only if, wages of Home workers with similar skills increase, 
too. Thus, unless the offshoring-led factor augmenting technological progress is highly biased against 
one sector,  workers/consumers worldwide enjoy higher real wages. Finally, none of these caveats 
apply to the two-way offshoring model of section 6 by virtue of the symmetry of the model, but all of 
them apply to the Helpman-Krugman monopolistic competition trade model.  
Immiserizing trade in tasks? 
Let us analyse now how trade in tasks affects the gains from trade in final goods. Controlling for the 
terms of trade effects (D D D Dp = 0), trading tasks does not affect the rationale of the gains from trade in 
final goods among nations with different factor endowments (gains from specialisation) or producing 
differentiated varieties in an imperfectly competitive environment (gains from increasing variety).  
Offshoring does, however, alter the patterns of production and the patterns of trade in final goods. As a 
result, trade in tasks alters the terms of trade p, which benefits one country at the expense of the other, 
and which hurts disproportionably some factor. Thus, in theory, it is conceivable that the offshoring 
country might be made worse of as a result of offshoring, as pointed out by Samuelson (2004). It must 
be stressed that this theoretical possibility is a special, extreme case which in general is not warranted. 
To summarise the findings of this section, we write:  
Proposition 9 (Welfare). Trade in tasks allows for a more efficient allocation of world resources. As a 
result, in all circumstances, the real wages of some workers in at least one country increase. 
More generally, it benefits all types of workers in all countries, unless labour cost-saving is 
highly biased towards some sectors and/or if it sways the terms of trade in final goods in an 
extreme way.  
In other words, unlike trade in final goods—which has polarising effects on factor rewards (Stolper 
and Samuelson 1941)—trade in tasks is more like a ‘tide that lifts all boats’. 
8.  Concluding remarks 
Our paper presents a simple model of offshoring that allows us to derive necessary and sufficient 
conditions on the sign of the wage, production and trade effects of offshoring. The model’s simplicity 
also allows us to re-formulate the four classic HOV theorems to account for trade in tasks (offshoring) 
as well as trade in goods. Our results can also be used to integrate the complex gallery of results 
derived in the extensive theoretical literature on offshoring/fragmentation. The key is that we view 
offshoring as ‘shadow migration’ that brings with it cost-savings that act as technological changes. 
This permits us to use the elegant analysis of Jones (1965). The paper also shows that the basic model 
can  easily  be  extended  to  account  for  two-way  offshoring  between  similar  nations.  To  bolster 
comparability between our results with offshoring and the four classic HOV theorems, we convey the 
bulk  of  our  analysis  in  a  Walrasian  setting,  but  we  show  that  it  applies  equally  in  a  simple 
monopolistic competition setting – that is, to a setting where the definition of a firm squares better with 32 
the spirit of the cause of offshoring in our framework – the technology edge of Home firms. Finally, 
we analyse the welfare implications of offshoring and find that, in our model, trade in tasks tends to 
increase the real wages of workers of all skills, in sharp contrast with the well-known unequal effects 
of trading final goods.  
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A.1.  Existence and uniqueness of diversified equilibrium with offshoring  
We  consider  the  case  of  service-task  offshoring  and  we  work  with  2 F I = =  throughout.  This 
appendix  has  two  aims.  First,  the  analysis  below  establishes  that  an  equilibrium  in  which  both 
countries remain diversified at the offshoring equilibrium exists under some conditions; when these 
hold, it is also unique. Second, seeking to find general conditions under which these are true is not 
very  rewarding  since  the  equilibrium  expressions  for  0 0 [ , ]' X Y º 0 X  and 
* *
0 0 [ , ]' X Y º
*
0 X  are  too 
unwieldy to be revealing (but see the last section of this appendix). We therefore follow a different 
route: we prove economically insightful conditions for some special cases to arise at equilibrium. To 











k f f º º Î = . 
Conveniently, fi is an industry-specific measure of offshoring: fi is the fraction of (labour) tasks that 
can be offshored in sector i; without offshoring  0 i f = . 
Formally,  let 
13
1 1 ( , *, , *, , , , , , , , , ) X Y LX LY X Y X Y L L k k a a q k k f f k k a + = ÎQ º ℝ  define  the  13-dimensional 
vector of parameters of the 2x2x2x2 model. Assumptions in the text about the relative factor intensities 
of industries and the relative factor abundances of countries restricts the set of value q might take to a 
subset of Q, defined as Q0, with  0 Q Ì Q. 
In the 2x2x2 model without offshoring, for instance, the (convex) subset of parameters defined as  
{ }
No Offshoring
0 1 , { , }: * , 0, 0 X Y i i i X Y k k q k k k f Q º ÎQ Î < < < = =  ensures that the diversified equilibrium 
described in the text exists and is unique (it is the unique solution to a system of linear independent 
equations).  Let  1 0 Q Ì Q  be  any  subset  of  parameters  of  the  model  such  that  both  countries  are 
diversified at the equilibrium both with offshoring and without. Let  1 Q ∪  be the union of all possible 
Q1, so  1 Q Ì Q ∪ .
33 Characterizing  1 Q ∪  is neither  insightful nor easy a task; however, we might 
characterize  some  of  its  elements.  Specifically,  we  shall  choose  some  (economically-meaningful) 
values  for  some  elements  of  the  vector  q1  and  then  impose  conditions  on  other  elements  of  q1 
(inequalities) that ensure that the diversified equilibrium exists. By continuity, we know that these 
inequalities ensure that such an equilibrium also exists in the neighbourhood of the initial values we 
have imposed; that is, for any  1 int q Î Q ∪  (i.e. for any q in  1 Q ∪  bar its boundaries), there exists a 
                                                
33 Hence 
No Offshoring
0 1 Q Î Q ∪ .  
13 e + Îℝ  such that  1 q e + Î Q ∪  for all e e < . Also, by the convexity of Q1, it is readily verified that, 
for any d in the unit interval and for some  1 1 Q Î Q ɶ ∪ , we have  1 1 , ' (1 ) ' q q dq d q ÎQ ⇒ + - Î Q ɶ ∪ . 
Thus, the general results we derive in the text are truly general indeed. For instance, the normalisations 
and parameter restrictions of the central case studied by Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2008) has 
1 0 i = k  and  (0,1) i f f = Î ,  , i X Y =  and the parameter restrictions in their section 4 implies  1 0 i i k k = >  
and (0,1) i f f = Î ,  , i X Y = . We characterise Q1 in such cases as well as in more general ones.  
A.2.  Conditions for  ,
*
0 0 X X > 0 when  1 {0, } i i k k Î  and  (0,1) i f f = Î ,  , i X Y =  
In this section we look at necessary and sufficient conditions that ensure that both countries remain 
fully diversified when an identical fraction of unskilled labour tasks can be offshored in both industries 
(0 1 i f f < = < ). In this case, Home output is equal to:  
1 1
0 0
1 1 1 1
( ) ( )
,
(1 ) ( ) (1 ) ( ) i i
Y Y X X
LX Y X Y X LY Y X Y X
k k k k L L
X Y
a a
l l l l
k f k k f k
f k k f k k f k k f k k
= =
- - - - - -
= = ×
- - - - - - - -
   (24) 
These  values  are  positive  if  the  relative  factor  abundance  remains  in  the  effective  cone  of 
diversification (i.e. adjusted for offshoring). Mathematically, this will be the case if the numerator and 
the denominator for both X0 and Y0 have the same sign. When X remains L-intensive with offshoring, 
this  is  the  case  if  1 1 (1 ) ( ) (1 ) (1 ) ( ) X X X Y Y Y k f k f k k f f k f k k - + - < - < - + - .
34  This  condition  is 
satisfied under the more general assumption A3 below. Further, using (24), assume first  0 i k = , which 
(together  with  i f f = )  implies 
1
0 [ (1 )( )] [ (1 ) ] /(1 ) LX Y X Y X a L k X f k k k f f
- = - - - - > - ,  which  is 
necessarily  positive  by  Assumption  2,  and   
1
0 [ (1 )( )] [(1 ) ] /(1 ) LY Y X X Y a L k Y f k k f k f
- = - - - - < - , 
which is positive only if the share of offshoreable tasks f is small enough; the inequalities follow from 
the closed-form solutions to (6).
35 Note that when unskilled labour services may be offshored then the 
output of the unskilled-labour intensive sector X rises by more than the output of the skilled-labour-
intensive sector Y (a Rybczynski effect that results from the ‘shadow migration’ effect of offshoring). 
Assuming instead that offshored services have the same factor intensities as non-offshored ones, i.e. 
1 0 i i k k = > , then the expressions in (24) simplify to (1-f)
-1X and (1-f)
-1Y, respectively: intuitively, 
offshoring allows Home factors to be employed on a subset 1-f of tasks, hence Home output is 1-f 
larger than it would be otherwise – hence offshoring is identical to Hicks-neutral technical progress in 
this case. 
                                                
34 Both numerators and both numerators are negative if these inequalities are reversed, in which case the production of 
good Y becomes L-intensive. 
35 Alternatively, to get the closed form solutions to X and Y, set f = 0 in the expressions for X0 and Y0 in the text.    
The values for Foreign output are too unwieldy to provide any insight, even in the relatively special 
case 0 1 i f f < = < . Hence we further assume that no skilled labour task is offshoreable ( 1 0 i = k ). For 
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Observe  that  the  output  of  the  unskilled-labour-intensive  sector  contracts,  i.e.  X0*  is  lower  with 
offshoring  (f>0)  that  without  (f=0),  whereas  Y0*  is  larger  than  Y*;  this,  again,  is  due  to  the 
Rybczynski  effect  that  is  a  consequence  of  the  shadow  (outward)  migration  brought  about  by 
offshoring. 
Foreign X-output remains positive if Foreign’s labour force is large enough so that production of both 
offshoring  services  and  production  of  Y*  do  not  fully  absorb  the  labour  force;  a  sufficient  and 
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Foreign X-output remains positive if Foreign’s labour force is large enough; a sufficient and necessary 
condition  is 
1 */ [(1 )( *)] ( ) Y Y L L k k f k f k
- > - - - ,  which  is  necessarily  fulfilled  if  Assumption  A0 
holds.  
A.3.  Conditions for  ,
*
0 0 X X > 0 when  1 i i k k =   
In this section we relax the assumption  i f f =  and we derive necessary and sufficient conditions so 
that  both  countries  produce  both  final  goods  at  the  offshoring  equilibrium  under  the  special  case 
1 i i = k k ,  , i X Y = . Let 
* * * *
0 0 0 0
* *
, , ,
X Y X Y
X Y X Y
num num num num
X Y X Y
den den den den
º º º º       (25) 
Under the assumption  1 i i = k k , Home output in both industries is positive without requiring further 
assumptions; indeed:   
1 1 0 0 0, 0
(1 ) (1 ) i i i i
Y X
LX X Y X LY Y Y X
k k L L
X Y
a a
k k k k
k k
f k k f k k
= =
- -
= > = >
- - - -
, 
where the inequality  follows from  our ranking of sectoral factor intensities.  Turn now to Foreign 
output. In this case, using the definitions in (25) we obtain: 
1 * ( )(1 ) 0
i i X LX Y X X den a
k k g k k f
= = - - > , 
where the inequality follows from our ranking of sectoral factor intensities, and 
1 * ( *)(1 ) * ( )
i i X Y X X Y num k L k L
k k k l f k
= = - - - - . 














In words, this says that the Foreign labour force has to be large enough not to be fully employed in 
producing offshoring tasks for Home firms. An analogous condition holds for K*/K if and only if 
assumption A1 holds. By the same token, using the definitions in (25), we get:  
1 * ( )(1 ) 0
i i Y LY Y X Y den a
k k g k k f
= = - - > , 
where the inequality follows from our ranking of sectoral factor intensities, and 
1 * ( * )(1 ) * ( )
i i Y X Y Y X num k L k L
k k k f f k
= = - - - - . 














Note that assumptions A1 and A2 are trivially satisfied for  0 i f = . 
A.4.  Sufficient conditions for  0 X > 0 
In this section, we provide sufficient and necessary conditions so that Home output is positive in both 
industries at the offshoring equilibrium in general. Let us start with X0. Using the definitions in (25): 
1 1
1 1
( ) (1 ) ( ),
(1 )( ) (1 )( ).
X
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        (26) 
Note that both expressions are trivially positive without offshoring. Similarly,   
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Both numX and numY are positive if, and only if, the following holds: 
Assumption A3.  1 1 ( ) ( )
1 1
X Y




k k k k k k
f f
+ - < < + -
- -
. 
That is, Home’s relative endowment must belong to the cone of diversification, adjusted for offshoring 
(obviously  0 i f = , all i, implies  X Y k < < k k ). 
Let 
min
1 max{0,[ (1 )]/ } X X X X k k k f f º - -  and 
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where  the  first  inequality  follows  from  0 Y num >  and  the  second  follows  from  0 X num > .
36 Thus, 
assumption A3 is sufficient to ensure that  0 i den > ,  , i X Y =  holds, too. 
A.5.  Sufficient conditions for 
*
0 X > 0 
The first result that is useful to us is  * ( ) i Y X i den den = - g k k , which ensures that  * * , 0 X Y den den >  if and 
only if  , 0 X Y den den > , which holds by assumption A3. Therefore, we may no longer worry about the 
sign and the zeroes of the denominators. A second useful set of results is that the relationship between 
output and the relative factor intensities of offshoreable tasks is monotonic:  
                                                
36 A more direct but slightly more cryptic proof would make use of the following identity, which follows from (26) and 
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where  1 1 1/ (1 )( ) (1 )( ) X Y Y Y Y X X X B f k f k f k f k º - - - + - -  the inequalities follow from assumption A3; 
note  that 1/ 0 B ¹  also  holds  by  assumption  A3.  Therefore,  in  general  there  exist  bounds  for  the 
parameters ki1, (i = X,Y) which we may express as functions of the remaining parameters of the model 
such that 
* *
0 0 , 0 X Y >  holds. We have characterised such restrictions in the previous sections of this 
Appendix.   
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Figure 1. Shadow-migration, cost-savings, and offshoring’s production and wage effects 
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